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Precluding the Absent Claimant
from Re-Arguing Class Certification:
Pragmatism and the "Day in Court" Ideal
BY ALEXANDER MOESER*

I. INTRODUCTION
n the recent case In re Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc., Tires Products
Liability Litigation,' the Seventh Circuit accorded broad preclusive
effect to the denial of class certification in a previous case2 when a
subsequent claimant attempted to have the same class certified in a
different court.3 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit broke new ground. The
Supreme Court has never squarely faced the issue, and no other court has
approached the issue in the same manner or drawn the same conclusion.'
The Seventh Circuit's decision raises fundamental questions about fairness
and due process in the context of the class action system.'

* J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank
Professor Mary J. Davis for suggesting the Bridgestonecase as the subject for this
Note.
'In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th
Cir. 2003).
2In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, Gustafson v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 537 U.S. 1105
(2003).
3 See Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 769.
' See, e.g., J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th
Cir. 1996) (finding that a subsequent claimant could not be bound by another
court's denial of certification); Furey v. Geriatric & Med. Ctrs., Inc., Nos. 92-5113,
93-2129, 1993 WL 283884, at * 1(E.D. Pa. July 29, 1993) (holding that there could
be no preclusion in this type of situation). For a discussion of these and related
authority, see infra Part IV.
5 The court in Bridgestone specifically limited its holding to proposed
nationwide classes. See Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 769. The arguments both for and
against preclusion apply equally to any proposed class with a nontrivial number of
potential claimants. Thus, this Note will not be limited to the discussion of
nationwide classes.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 92

The issue arises as follows.6 One member in a group with a common
potential claim files suit and seeks to have the group certified as a class.
The court then denies certification, finding that the proposed class fails to
meet one or more of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 ("Rule 23").' At this point, the case may proceed as a non-class action
case or the plaintiff may choose to discontinue the litigation after certification is denied. After the denial of certification, a party8 who was not
involved in the first litigation, but who would have been a member of the
prior class if it had been certified, files suit against the same defendant in
a different court seeking to have the same class certified. The defendant
may then seek to have the second court estop the attempted certification, or
alternatively, may go back to the first court and seek an injunction
preventing the second court from granting certification. 9
This type of preclusion, of course, does not prevent the subsequent
claimant from pursuing his individual claim; it merely prevents the
subsequent claimant from certifying a class identical to one that was
previously denied.' ° This preclusion is significant, however, and in many
cases will be determinative of whether the subsequent claimant can, as a
practical matter, pursue his individual claim at all."1 Class certification
affects the burdens, risks, and potential payoffs that parties consider in
determining whether to bring litigation and whether to settle.' 2 Particularly
in suits where plaintiffs are seeking small amounts of money damages, the

6See,

e.g., id. at 763. This scenario is present in Bridgestoneand is the typical
fact pattern in class preclusion cases.
7In order to be certified as a class, the court must find that the proposed class
meets the Rule 23(a) requirements of impracticability of joinder, commonality,
typicality, adequacy of representation, and that the proposed class fits one of the
approved class types under Rule 23(b). FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
8 For the sake of simplicity, throughout this Note the term "plaintiff' will be
reserved for the party who first seeks class certification. The party seeking
certification in a subsequent suit will be referred to as the "potential claimant" or
"subsequent claimant" as is appropriate to the context.
9 See, e.g., Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 763, 765.
o See Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 769.
'See, e.g., Charles Silver, "We're Scaredto Death ": Class Certificationand
Blackmail,78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429 (2003) (asserting that defendants "prefer
single-plaintiff lawsuits in which they possess significant advantages, including
economies of scale and superior tolerance for risk").
2 Id. It is reasonable
to assume that if the defendant is advantaged in a single
suit trial, the denial or grant of class certification will affect plaintiff's decision on
whether to settle or to bring litigation.
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class action's aggregation of small claims may be the only economically3
viable way for the possible rewards to outweigh the risks of proceeding.1
While not formally precluding the subsequent claimant from bringing his
individual claim, the Bridgestone approach may effectively prevent the
subsequent claimant from having a meaningful chance at recovery.
This Note analyzes the arguments for and against precluding subsequent claimants from seeking certification of the same class that has been
denied in a prior suit. Part H describes the arguments used by the
Bridgestone court favoring preclusion. 4 Part III examines the doctrinal
problems with precluding subsequent claimants. 5 Part IV examines
Supreme Court precedents and other authority supporting the argument that
the Bridgestone approach is inconsistent with current federal
jurisprudence. 6 Finally, Part V proposes that the extent of preclusion
should depend on the type of class at issue and the reasons for denial of
certification in the initial case. 7
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR PRECLUSION

This Part describes the reasoning behind the Bridgestone court's
decision favoring broad preclusion of subsequent certification attempts.
The court cited three arguments for preclusion: an argument for efficiency,
an argument for accuracy, and an argument for symmetry.'"
For context, the facts and procedural history of Bridgestone will be
briefly explained. The original plaintiffs filed suit against
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. in the Southern District of Indiana seeking
certification of a nationwide class of SUV owners with defective tires who
had not yet suffered tire failures. 9 The District Court certified the class
under Rule 23(b)(3), finding that the requirements of predominance and

'3

See RICHARD A, POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.11, at 585-86

(6th ed. 2003) (describing the class action as a mechanism for allowing small
claims to overcome the relatively high fixed costs of litigation).
"' See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
'5 See infra notes 42-79 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 80-112 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 113-151 and accompanying text.
" See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
766-67 (7th Cir. 2003).
'"See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D.
503, 534 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev 'd, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing decision
to certify class).
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superiority in proceeding as a class were met. 2' The Seventh Circuit
reversed the lower court and decertified the class.2' In finding that the class
did not meet the requirements of Rule 23(bX3), the court relied on
variations in the types of tires at issue,22 and on variations in the state laws
that would have to be applied in a nationwide class. 3
After the decertification, at least five subsequent claimants who were
not involved in the first case sought to have the same nationwide class
certified in various state courts. 24 After one of the state court judges
certified a nationwide class, Bridgestone sought an injunction from the
District Court to enforce the previous decertification decision against "any
class action."2 5 When this motion was denied, defendants appealed. 26 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, ordering the District Court to grant an injunction
prohibiting other courts from certifying a nationwide class.27 While
Bridgestone sought an injunction preventing "any class" from certification,28 the Seventh Circuit specifically limited its ruling to nationwide
classes identical to the class that had been denied certification.29
The first argument in support of the Bridgestone approach is derived
from an interest in efficiency. A general principle underlying preclusion is
that "judicial economy demands that cases not be retried continually."30
The court in Bridgestonerecognized this principle by stating "when federal
20

See id. at 519-32.
21 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d
1012, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002), rev 'g205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001), andsubsequent
appeal denied, 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (ruling on preclusion).
22Seeid. at 1018.
23 See id. at 1019-20.
4 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
765 (7th Cir. 2003).
25 See id. (emphasis omitted).
26 See id.
27 See id. at 769.
28 See id. at 765 (stating that Bridgestone sought an injunction against "any
class action, even one limited to a single product in a single state").
29 See id. at 769.
30 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §

14.9, at 675. But cf

POSNER, supra note 13, § 21.13, at 576-77. Posner argues that in preclusion

situations generally, the possibility of relitigation is not as inefficient as is generally
thought. If an issue was fully litigated in one court, the subsequent plaintiff will
only devote the resources to relitigation if he believes that there is a substantial
chance the first court erred in its decision. Posner concludes that if there is a
substantial chance of error in the first decision, there is no reason why relitigation
should not occur. Id.
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litigation is followed by many duplicative state suits, it is sensible to handle
the preclusive issue once and for all in the original case, rather than put the
parties and state judges through an unproductive exercise. 31
The second argument derives from an interest in accuracy of decision.
The Seventh Circuit was concerned that if subsequent attempts at certification were not precluded, an improper result might occur.32 The court used
the following hypothetical to illustrate the potential for an incorrect
outcome.3 3 In the absence of preclusion, even if ninety percent of judges
would refuse to certify a particular class (thus making the "proper" decision
by denying certification), class-seekers could simply re-file their case in
additional courts until they find the one judge in ten who would grant
certification (thus reaching the "improper" decision). 34 Applying a basic
probability function,35 the Seventh Circuit noted that if ninety percent of
judges would deny certification and the class certification is attempted in
ten courts, there is a sixty-five percent chance of having the class
certified. 36 If certification is attempted in twenty courts, there is an eightyeight percent chance of having the class certified. 37 As the number of
attempts at certification increases, eventually the probability of finding a
judge who will certify the class approaches one hundred percent. No matter
how aberrant the decision to grant certification, "[a] single positive trumps
all the negatives., 3' Not precluding subsequent attempts at certification
leads to an improper result, meaning a decision contrary to the outcome that
would be reached by a majority of judges looking at the issue.39
31 See

Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 766.
See id. at 766-67.
13See id.
31Id. at 766 (noting that "if one nationwide class is certified, then all the nocertification decisions fade into insignificance").
3'The probability of certification is 1-(c) where c is the chance that any
particular judge will deny certification and n is the number of courts in which
certification is attempted. Id. at 767.
36Id. If attempted in ten courts, the formula
would look like this: 1-(.90io) = 1(.35)37= 65%.
Id. If attempted in twenty courts, the formula would look like this: 1-(.90"°)
= 1-(.12) = 88%.
3 See id. at 766-67.
39There are two questionable assumptions underlying the court's analysis
worth
pointing out. First, the analysis assumes attempts at certification are costless to the
claimants. Second, the analysis only works if we assume the class-seekers are either
the same parties, represented by the same attorneys, or somehow in collusion.
Whether these assumptions are valid or not, the court's general concern for
32
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The final argument of the Bridgestone court supporting preclusion is
an argument derived from the desire to treat litigants similarly. The Seventh
Circuit referred to the situation absent preclusion as a "heads-I-win, tailsyou-lose situation" for the plaintiffs seeking class certification.4" Certification would "stick[ ] (because it subsumes all other suits) while a nocertification decision has no enduring effect."'', A simple fairness argument
supports the notion that a decision favoring certification and a decision
rejecting certification should have the same practical effect.
The basic principles of efficiency, accuracy, and symmetry offer functional and pragmatic justifications for the approach taken in Bridgestone.
Having examined the reasons favoring a broad preclusive effect for denials
of certification, it is necessary to turn to the doctrinal objections that may
be raised to its application.
II. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRECLUSION
Precluding absent claimants from pursuing their claims in a subsequent
class action raises several issues of basic fairness and due process. At the
core of the issue is the difficulty of binding parties who were not present
in a prior litigation to a decision made without their participation or even
their knowledge. A basic principle of due process is that only those who
were involved in a prior litigation can be bound by its judgment.42 This
principle extends to plaintiffs as well as defendants, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects "persons," not "defendants. 43 The Supreme Court has
found this principle to be of fundamental importance, providing an
exception to the general rule only for proper classes." This Part examines
the difficulties of reconciling the Bridgestone approach to preclusion with
the legal system's traditional respect for the notion that each plaintiff
should have his "day in court.""
The concerns raised in this Part specifically, and this Note generally,
do not apply to the similar but distinguishable situation in which a plaintiff

accuracy in the law is a valid consideration.
40 See Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 767.
41

Id.
See FRIEDENTHAL

ET AL., supra note 30, § 14.13, at 699.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
44See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940).
4' For an explanation and criticism of the "day in court" ideal, see generally
Robert T. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992).
42

43
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failing to achieve certification in one forum withdraws his case and then
seeks class certification in a different forum. In that situation, the plaintiff
is barred from re-arguing the certification under principles of collateral
estoppel, since the plaintiff had been a party to a proceeding in which the
issue was actually and finally decided.46 The concerns raised here apply
only to situations in which the subsequent claimant was not a party,
formally or otherwise, to the first attempt at certification.
A. Lack of Notice
The first due process concern stems from the absence ofnotice required
to bind potential claimants to the denial of class certification. It is well
settled that in the absence of notice, a court's power to bind absent parties
to a judgement is limited.47 The notice must be "reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Moreover, the notice must be accompanied by an opportunity to appear; the
right to notice has "little reality or worth unless one ... can choose for
48
himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest."
By definition, the subsequent claimants were not parties to the first
litigation. There was no requirement that notice be given to them or that
they be allowed to appear. The Federal Rules require that notice be given
to class members in certain class actions. 49 For classes certified under Rule
23(b)(3), the Rule requires detailed notice, which must be "the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort."5 The notice
must inform the members of the right to opt out, the preclusive effect of a
judgment if they do not opt out, and the right to appear through counsel,
among other things." In all other types of class actions, notice is at the
discretion of the court. 2
§§ 14.9-14.11, at 675-93.
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
4 Id.
Of course, even if there had been notice and an opportunity to appear, this
still would not suffice to bind the absent parties. "Joinder as a party, rather than
knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which
potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a
judgment
or decree." Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756 (1989).
49
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
" See id. R. 23(c)(2)(B).
46 See generallyFRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 30,
17See

51Id.
52Id.
R.

23(c)(2)(A) (providing that in "any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1)
or (2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class." (emphasis added)); id.
R. 23(d) (providing that "the court may make appropriate orders ...requiring
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Moreover, in a case such as Bridgestone, in which the individual
damages are likely to be small and the proposed class is large,53 it is likely
that many potential claimants will be unaware of the first plaintiff's filing. 4
Absent parties without notice could not be bound if they were defendants. 5
Therefore, it seems inequitable to bind absent potential claimants to what
may be a dispositive resolution of their claims.56
B. Binding Absent Parties Without Meeting Class Requirements
Beyond the basic due process concerns relating to notice and the
opportunity to be heard, there is a troubling paradox in the logic of binding
absent potential claimants to a denial of certification. In denying certification to a proposed class, a court decides that the proposed class fails to
meet the cohesiveness requirements of Rule 23." At the same time, in
binding absent potential claimants, the court determines that those
claimants effectively have had their "day in court" through the attempts of
the first plaintiff. This violates the most basic rule of preclusion: only
parties to the first litigation can be bound by the court's decision. 8
While courts have occasionally sanctioned binding nonparties under the
doctrine of virtual representation, 9 that doctrine is inappropriate in these

...
that notice be given").
13See In re Bridgestone/Firestone,

Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
765 (7th Cir. 2003) (claim involving three million vehicles).
" The situation may be different, of course, when the number of potential
claimants is limited and easily ascertainable (e.g., an airline crash).
" See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928) (holding that a New Jersey

law was unconstitutional because it provided for simple notice to the Secretary of
State as sufficient to bind an absent defendant).
16The Supreme Court's holding in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.

797, 811 (1985), suggests that foreclosing a potential absent plaintiffs claim is
entitled to lower levels of due process protection than binding an absent defendant

to a judgment. Shutts, however, can be read to give equal treatment for the subject
at hand, and is discussed further in Part IV.
57See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see infra Part V for a discussion of the requirements
for forming a class under Rule 23.
5 See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 30, § 14.13, at 699 (discussing
the general principles underlying res judicata).
59
See generally Jack L. Johnson, Comment, Due or Voodoo Process: Virtual
Representation as a Justification of a Nonparty's Claim, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1303
(1994). The doctrine of virtual representation can bind an individual to ajudgment
"'even though [he is] not a party if one of the parties to the suit is so closely
aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representation.' "Id. at 1314 (quoting
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circumstances. Virtual representation requires such a close identity of
interests between the present and absent parties that it can be deemed fair
to hold the absent party to the decision of the first court.6" In denying a
class certification, however, the court is holding that the case cannot
proceed as if the named representatives adequately represent the interests
of all potential claimants. Moreover, the Bridgestone court explicitly
rejected the doctrine of virtual representation, both in principle and as
applied to the particular case at issue.6' "[O]utside the domain of class
actions, precedent rather than preclusion is the way one case influences
another. 62
If the first court finds that the plaintiffs are not typical of the potential
class, do not offer common questions of law or fact, or will not adequately
represent the interests of the class as a whole, it is impossible to conclude
that the plaintiffs in the first suit satisfy the Rule 23(a) requirements of
typicality, commonality, or adequacy for the purposes of subsequent
preclusion. This conflict must be resolved before subsequent claimants can
be equitably bound by a decision to which they were not a party.
C. The Right to Opt Out
Also troubling is the fact that the potential claimants that were bound
by the denial of certification in Bridgestonewere never given the opportunity to opt out of the class action process in the first case.6 3 A Rule 23(b)(3)
class action, the type of class initially certified in Bridgestone, explicitly
requires that the notice given to class members include notice of the right
to opt out of the class litigation in order to not be bound by the decisions
pertaining to the class.' The Supreme Court has held that this opt-out right
is of fundamental constitutional importance.65 Without a right to opt out, an
absent class member in a Rule 23(b)(3) class cannot be bound to the
Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975)).
60 See id. at 1312.
61 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
769 (7th Cir. 2003).
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
6 See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (holding that
"due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an
opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an 'opt
out' . . . form to the court").
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judgment.' Courts have also held that it is within the discretion of district
court judges to allow opting out in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes.67
By definition, the subsequent claimants in the scenario discussed in this
Note did not receive notice, and therefore did not have an opportunity to
opt out of the proceedings. The Seventh Circuit in Bridgestoneheld that the
opt-out right was a "post-certification" requirement, and therefore was not
fatal to the preclusion. 68 This analysis entirely begs the question, however.
The Seventh Circuit based its preclusion on the fact that the certification
was treated as a sort of quasi-class. 69 In fact, the court stated, "Our
suit... was commenced as a class action, and one vital issue was litigated
and resolved on a class-wide basis: whether a nationalclass is tenable. 70
The court applied the burden of class action preclusion to the subsequent
claimants without according them the benefit of notice and the right to opt
out.
D. The Absence of Power to Bind Absent Plaintiffs
Finally, there is a difficulty in identifying the procedural powers of a
court that permit it to bind subsequent claimants. The court in the
subsequent litigation can entertain a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim based on collateral estoppel through virtual
representation.7 1 Alternatively, the original court may issue an injunction
through its equitable powers under the All Writs Act.7 2 In a case such as
Bridgestone, however, this injunction power is limited by the AntiInjunction Act.73 The Anti-Injunction Act prevents federal courts from
interfering with state court proceedings except when authorized by statute,
or when necessary to preserve jurisdiction or effectuate ajudgment.7 4 None
of these exceptions would apply in these cases. The original court remains
free to continue exercising jurisdiction and to fashion any appropriate
remedy.

Id.
67 See, e.g.,
66

Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 769.
id.
id.
7'See supra Part III.B.
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2003).
7 See id. § 2283.
14See id.

68 See
69 see
70 See
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The Bridgestonecourt avoided confronting the question of its authority
to bind the subsequent claimants by treating them as if they were present
in the first litigation.7 5 Without much discussion of how or why it was
necessary to preclude the subsequent claimants from seeking certification,
the court ordered an injunction.76 Noting that "[n]ormally the second court
[in this case the state court] determines the preclusive effect of a judgment," the Seventh Circuit chose to make an exception based on the
pragmatic considerations.""
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
AND RELATED AUTHORITY FROM OTHER CIRCUITS

As mentioned in the Introduction, no other court has reached the same
conclusion as the Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone. The Supreme Court has
never addressed the issue and no reported case from lower courts has
followed the same analysis. There are related cases, however, that can point
to the way in which this issue would likely be resolved by the Supreme
Court that were ignored or misinterpreted by the Seventh Circuit in
Bridgestone. This Part first briefly analyzes the holdings and arguments of
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,78 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,79 and
Devlin v. Scardelletti,0 applying the principles derived from those cases to
the situation at issue in this Note. This Part then examines cases from other
federal circuits that attempt to answer the question of how to treat the
absent potential claimant for purposes of preclusion.
A. Related Supreme Court Precedent
Shutts explored the bounds of personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs in the
class action context."1 Specifically, it involved the question of whether
absent nonresident class members could be bound by a judgment in
personam 2 It is applicable to the Bridgestone question because both
71See Bridgestone, 333

F. 3d at 769.

See id. at 766.
See id.; see also supra Part II (discussing the pragmatic considerations used
by the court).
78 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
7 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
80 Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
SI See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 797.
76

77

82

See id. at 805.
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personal jurisdiction and preclusion of subsequent claimants are at their
core questions of a court's power to bind absent parties.
The Court in Shutts found, first, that absent class action plaintiffs were
not entitled to the same level of due process protection as defendants,
reasoning that they were less burdened because they were not forced to
appear against their will.83 In fact, absent plaintiffs, unlike defendants, do
not have to appear at all.8 4 The Court also found that, despite the option of
absent class members to do nothing, the court "must provide minimal
procedural due process protection. ' 85 This protection included, at a
minimum, "the best practicable" notice of the pendency of the class action,
the opportunity to appear and to be heard, and "an opportunity to remove
himself from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request
for exclusion' form to the court."86
The Bridgestone court ignored this clear constitutional mandate to
provide notice and the opportunity to opt out by holding that the subsequent
claimants were effectively parties to the prior litigation because their
interests were adequately represented. 7 The distinction drawn by the
Seventh Circuit is really no distinction at all. The Supreme Court in Shutts
88
explicitly noted that the absent plaintiffs had been adequately represented.
If the absent plaintiffs in Shutts had not been adequately represented, the
Court would simply have reversed the certification decision on Rule 23(a)
grounds, never reaching the due process issue.
Moreover, in Eisen, the Supreme Court expressly addressed the
question of whether adequate representation could substitute for defective
notice in a class action.89 The Court responded to the argument that
adequate representation alone sufficed, holding that "this view has little to
commend it. . . .Rule 23 speaks to notice as well as to adequacy of
representation and requires that both be provided."90 The Seventh Circuit
in Bridgestone did not address this seemingly clear mandate from Eisen.
Another more recent case dealing with the rights of absent class
members is Devlin v. Scardelletti,a case that was cited by the Bridgestone

See id. at 808.
Id.
5 See id. at 811-12.
86
Id. at 812.
81 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
768-69 (7th Cir. 2003).
88 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808 n. 1.
9See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974).
90 See id. (emphasis added).
83

84
8
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court in support of its reasoning. 9' A closer analysis of the Supreme Court's
holding in Devlin shows, however, that the Seventh Circuit misapplied
Devlin in holding that subsequent claimants were precluded by the initial
denial of class certification.
Devlin, like Shutts, dealt with an issue that may initially seem
tangential to the Bridgestone issue. Devlin examined the question of
whether non-named parties who did not intervene in the class action had a
right to appeal the district court's determination that the class settlement
was fair.92 The Court held that non-named members who objected to the
settlement at a fairness hearing have the right to bring an appeal. 93 The
Seventh Circuit in Bridgestone cited Devlin as evidence that non-named
class members have the same benefits and burdens as named class
members.94 The Bridgestone court held that "[t]he premise of allowing
class members to seek review by a higher court is that otherwise they would
be bound by defeat." 95
This reading of Devlin, however, is mistaken for several reasons. First,
it collapses the distinction between a certified class (as in Devlin) and a
class that has merely been proposed. Second, it ignores the principles
underlying Devlin by selectively emphasizing the one aspect of the holding
that would support preclusion. Devlin recognized first that "[n]onnamed
class members ...may be parties for some purposes and not for others." 96
Additionally, and more importantly, Devlin was foremost concerned with
the principle that courts should not "deprive nonnamed class members of
the power to preserve their own interests." 97 Under the factual circumstances of Devlin in which non-named parties in a class action believed
their interests diverged from that of the named plaintiffs, the Court could
best serve its function of protecting the non-named parties' rights by
treating them as parties. In a factual situation like that in Bridgestone, the
same paramount interest is served by allowing absent parties to have their
"day in court," by treating them as if they were not parties to the initial
certification decision. Thus, a closer reading of Shutts and Devlin leads to

9'See Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 768.

See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1,4 (2002). Note that Rule 23 requires
that the court examine any proposed settlement for fairness. See FED. R. CIv. P.
23(e)(1)(A).
9 Devlin, 536 U.S. at 14.
4See Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 768.
9'See id.
96See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9-10.
92

97See id. at 10.
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the conclusion that subsequent claimants should not be bound by the
determinations of the prior court denying certification.
B. Related Authority from Other Circuits
In addition to Supreme Court precedents that shed light on the proper
outcome in a Bridgestone situation, cases from other federal courts are
instructive. There are two reported cases dealing with the same issue as
Bridgestone that reach the opposite result, along with several others that
decide closely related issues.
One of the two cases dealing with the identical issue involved in
Bridgestone, Furey v. Geriatric & Medical Centers, Inc.,98 cites no
authority and offers no analysis to support its finding that subsequent
classification attempts should not be precluded. It merely states: "The fact
that the plaintiffs [from the first case] . . . have been precluded from
seeking recovery on behalf of the putative class does not-indeed, could
not lawfully--preclude other members of the class from bringing an action
on behalf of the class."99
The Fifth Circuit, in JR. Clearwater,Inc. v. Ashland Chemical Co.,0 0
offers only slightly more analysis in the course of rejecting the defendant's
arguments for preclusion. The court in JR. Clearwaterheld that it did not
have the power to enjoin state court proceedings because the injunction
would not fall within any of the exceptions of the Anti-Injunction Act.'
The court relied on the differences in state and federal class action rules
and the discretion inherent in the class certification decision.' 02 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit recognized that "[a]ny doubts as to the propriety of
an injunction must be resolved in favor of allowing the state court action
to go forward."'0 3 The decision and logic in JR. Clearwater are the
opposite of those in Bridgestone. In light of the implications of the

9' Furey v. Geriatric & Med. Ctrs., Inc., Nos. 92-5113, 93-2129, 1993 WL
283884 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1993).
99 Id. at *1.
"' J.R. Clearwater, Inc. v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176 (5th Cir. 1996).
Unlike Bridgestone, JR. Clearwater does not deal with identical classes; it
involves classes that have substantial overlap between their members. Id. at 178.
However, the Anti-Injunction Act analysis of JR. Clearwaterapplies regardless
of whether the similarity between classes is total or merely substantial.
.oSee id. at 178-79; see supra Part III.D (discussing the Anti-Injunction Act).
102 See JR. Clearwater,93 F.3d at 180.
'1oSee id. at 179.
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Bridgestone holding discussed in Part III, the reasoning in J.R. Clearwater
seems to better comport with due process requirements.
While Furey and J.R. Clearwaterare the only two cases to address the
same issue as Bridgestone,several other courts have dealt with the question
of whether potential class members are bound by ajudgment when the class
is either never certified, or certified and subsequently decertified. The
consensus among the cases is that an absent potential class member will not
be bound by any decisions of the first court if the action does not proceed
as a class action.1 4
The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and the District of
Columbia Circuits have examined the question of whether a grant of
summary judgment for the defendant before a certification decision will
bind absent potential class members. All held that it will not.'0 5 The
Seventh Circuit held that "the defendants, by moving for summary
judgment prior to the class determination and the sending out of class
notice, assumed the risk that a judgment in their favor would not protect
them from subsequent suits by other potential class members."'0 6 The
Seventh and Ninth Circuits applied the same logic concerning preclusion
after a pre-certification dismissal of the action. 7 While according
preclusive effect to a summary judgment or dismissal is in some ways
different than according preclusive effect to a denial of certification, the
underlying principle is the same. As Judge Posner stated in Morlan, "[u]ntil
certification there is no class action but merely the prospect of one."' '
In another case directly analogous to a denial of certification, the Third
Circuit held that a decertification decision is not entitled to preclusive
effect against those elsewhere participating in a class action.'0 9 The court

o See Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Schwarzschild v. Tse, 69 F.3d 293, 297 (9th Cir. 1995); Roberts v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 526 F.2d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 1975).
' 05 See Curtin, 275 F.3d at93; Schwarzschild,69 F.3d at 297; Roberts, 526 F.2d
at 763.
"oSee Roberts, 526 F.2d at 762-63; see also Schwarzschild, 69 F.3d at 297
(holding that defendants, by moving for summary judgment before certification,
can only rely on" 'the slender reed of stare decisis,' "not preclusion, as protection
against subsequent suits (quoting Postow v. OBA Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 627
F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
'0 See Morlan v. Universal Guar. Life Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 609,616-17 (7th Cir.
2002);
Diaz v. Trust Territory, 876 F.2d 1401, 1411 (9th Cir. 1989).
108 Morlan, 298 F.3d at 616.
109 See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
134 F.3d 133, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1998).
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in In re GeneralMotors Corp.Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank ProductsLiability
Litigation held that a decertification decision is not the type of final
judgment that would have preclusive effect and as a result would not
qualify for an exception under the Anti-Injunction Act." 0
V. DISTINGUISHING AMONG THE
REASONS FOR DENIALS OF CERTIFICATION
A court may deny certification for many reasons,"' and in order to
reconsider the pragmatic concerns discussed in Part II with the due process
concerns in Part III, it is necessary to distinguish between the various
reasons why a certification is denied.
This Part begins by examining the requirements common to all class
actions, which are found in Rule 23(a). This Part then considers the various
types of classes discussed in Rule 23(b) and how each class should be
treated with regard to preclusion issues.
A. Rule 23(a) Requirements
To be certified, the proposed class must meet the four requirements of
Rule 23(a)." 2 First, the members of the proposed class must be "so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."' '13 Second, there
must be "questions of law or fact common to the class.""' ' Third, "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties... [must be] typical of the
claims or defenses of the class."' '"And finally, the court must find that "the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class." 6 If a proposed class fails to meet any of these requirements, it is
unnecessary to consider the requirements of Rule 23(b)." 7
The first three of these requirements do not pose any difficult issues
regarding preclusion. The fourth requirement, adequacy of representation,
however, does merit further discussion. The adequacy inquiry includes four

"'

See id.at 146.

." See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) and (b).

"' See id. R. 23(a).
113Id.
114Id.

115
Id.
116

id.

"'

See FRIEDENTHAL

ET AL.,

supra note 30, § 16.2, at 740-41 (describing the

Rule 23(a) and (b) inquiries as a "two-step" process).
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factors."' First, the named parties and their lawyers must assert the absent
class members' claims. Second, there must be an "identity" of claims
within the class. Third, the named parties and their lawyers must be
competent, in light of the size and complexity of the class action. And
fourth, there must be no conflicts of interest between the named parties,
their counsel, and the absent class members." 9 This final requirement for
adequacy of representation depends primarily on whether there is relative
uniformity of interests among the class members.' If there are disparate
interests within the class, there may not be a named party who could
adequately represent all of the interests of the class as a whole.
Denials of certification based on inadequacy ofrepresentation can thus
be further divided into two categories: inadequacy because of deficiency
and inadequacy because of conflict. 2' In the first type of inadequacy
denials, it seems clear that there can be no preclusion of subsequent
claimants. If the basis of the denial of certification is that the lawyer
seeking certification is not adequate, then this provides the strongest case
for not precluding subsequent claimants. Not only did the subsequent
claimants not have their day in court, but the plaintiffs who did have their
day in court were represented by an attorney who was found to be lacking
in some respect. It could be argued, allowing for differences among judges,
that the success of the attorney in the second suit, in circumstances similar
to those present in Bridgestone, raises the presumption that the attorney in
the first suit was not adequate because he failed to secure certification.
If, on the other hand, certification is denied because there are irreconcilable conflicts within the class that would render any named representative inadequate, the issue of whether preclusion is proper is more difficult.
If a court held there are classes with irreconcilable differences, thus
denying certification, but proceeded with a sub-class of the original
proposed class, the court may need to issue an injunction to preserve its
See Howard M. Downs, FederalClass Actions: Due Process by Adequacy
of Representation (Identity of Claims) and the Impact of General Telephone v.
Falcon, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 607, 635 (1993).
18

119Id.
'20 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940) (holding that
African-American homebuyers were not adequately represented by class
representatives that sought to enforce racially restrictive covenant). See generally
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supranote 30, § 16.2, at 746 ("The most critical factor to be
scrutinized when determining adequacy of representation is whether conflicting or
antagonistic interests exist between the representatives and other members of the
class.").
12 See Downs, supra note 120, at 644.
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jurisdiction. In this circumstance, a subsequent court would be directly
overruling the considered decision of the original court, and thus should
proceed with caution.
B. Rule 23(b) Classes
If a proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a), the court next
22
considers if it falls into any of the types of permissible classes in 23(b).1
The categories are the injunctive class action, 23 the limited fund class
action, 124 and the opt-out class action. 125 The different natures and effects
of each type of class action lead to different conclusions about the
appropriateness of according a denial of certification preclusive effect
against subsequent claimants.
1. Injunctive Classes
In cases seeking injunctive relief (including proposed (b)(1)(A) classes,
which may seek injunctive relief as well as money damages), precluding
subsequent claimants from certifying classes is not as inequitable as it is in
other types of class actions. For instance, injunctive classes are less likely
to be extinguished by a denial of classification since they do not seek
money damages. 26 In proposed class actions that seek small amounts of
monetary damages, the inability to proceed as a class may make proceeding
at all economically impossible. A claimant seeking injunctive relief,
however, can achieve the same relief whether proceeding as a class or not.
In fact, it is the defendant in such cases who may wish to have the class
27
certified to avoid inconsistent and incompatible equitable judgments.'
In cases when a court denies certification because a class would not
meet the requirements of Rule (b)(2) or (b)(1)(A), the court has already
decided that the class is cohesive enough to meet the requirements of Rule
23(a) and that class members have been adequately represented at the first

122See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 30,
123 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). For the purposes

§ 16.2, at 747.

of this Note, the 23(b)(1)(A) class
action will be considered along with the 23(b)(2) class action; the differences are
irrelevant
to the discussion.
24 Id. R.
23(b)(l)(B).
125 Id. R. 23(b)(3).
126 See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
127 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l)(A), (b)(2).
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stage.128 Therefore, the availability of proceeding as an individual, coupled
with the likelihood that a defendant in a purely injunctive suit will not
oppose certification, combine to allay fears about overbroad application of
preclusion doctrines.
2. Limited Fund Classes
Classes can also be certified when "adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class . . . would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests. ,1 29 These limited fund classes are appropriate when there is a
limited fund available to potential claimants and the first to sue would
recover at the expense of those slower to file. 3 ° This type of class is
designed to prevent the "race to the courthouse" scenario, in which
"[e]arly-filing claimants would receive full value on their claims, and laterfiling claimants would receive pennies on the dollar or nothing."'' The
availability of these classes mitigates the problem caused by situations in
which defendants with limited funds lack incentives to join all potential
32
claimants in one case.
Limited fund classes are similar to the opt-out classes discussed
below, 13 3 but have one special, if obvious, feature that merits discussing.
The answer to the question of whether or not there is a limited fund may
change over time. For example, a company's business profits may decline
or more claimants (or claimants with more costly injuries) may emerge."
Either of these scenarios will affect the risk of prejudice to late-coming

See supra Part V.A.
FED. R. Cir. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
130 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 30, § 16.2, at 748.
128

129
31

JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANSGRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS
IN ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 131 (2002).
'

132 Id.

Some plaintiffs have sought to have their mass tort classes certified as Rule
23(b)(1)(B) classes rather than (b)(3), but courts are reluctant to forego the class
member protections of(b)(3) without a genuinely limited fund. See FRIEDENTHAL
ET AL., supra note 30, § 16.2, at 747 n.50.
134 One need only think of high profile class actions such as asbestos cases to
133

see how estimates of potential liability may change with advances in medical

science. For a description ofthe slow process in which manufacturers and scientists
came to increasingly recognize the hazards of asbestos, see Borel v. Fibreboard
PaperProducts Corp. 493 F. 2d 1076, 1083-85 (5th Cir. 1974).
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claimants. It would be inappropriate to forever foreclose the possibility of
finding a limited fund based on a snapshot of a company's assets and
potential liabilities at one given moment. Therefore, Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
denials based on the absence of a truly limited fund should not be given
preclusive effect.
3. Opt-Out Classes
Classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), unlike the other types of classes,
require that the notice given to potential class members inform them of
their right to opt out of the class to avoid being bound by its judgments. 135
Hence, they have become known as "opt-out classes." This type of class,
which was the proposed class in Bridgestone,'36 presents distinct issues.
Rule 23(b)(3) lists the considerations courts should weigh in deciding
whether or not to certify a class.'37 The court must decide whether common
questions predominate over individual issues, and whether the class would
be a superior method of proceeding. 31 In making this determination, the
court looks at:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
1 39
action.
There are two approaches that courts could take in assessing the
applicability of preclusion against subsequent claimants proposed under
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. First, given the special notice and opt-out
requirements discussed above, 4 ' a court could take the position that it is

13'See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
36

See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D.
503, 519-32 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing
certification decision), andsubsequentappealdenied,333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003)
(ruling on preclusion).
137 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
'

3

18

id.

139Id.
'40

See supra Parts III.A and III.C.
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never appropriate to bind a subsequent claimant to a decision in which he
was not given notice and an opportunity to opt-out. 4 ' Unlike the Seventh
Circuit in Bridgestonewhich held that "[n]o one is entitled to opt out of the
certification [process],"'' 2 courts could reasonably determine that in
potential Rule 23(b)(3) classes, everyone is entitled to opt out of the
certification process.
In the alternative, courts could adopt a particularized approach that
examines the predominance and superiority considerations listed in Rule
23(b)(3). For example, the determination of whether or not it would be
desirable to concentrate the litigation in a particular forum 4 3 obviously
depends on the particular forum at issue. A court may find it unfair or
unwise to concentrate litigation in its district, if for example, while venue
and jurisdiction would be technically proper, there might be a district that
would be more convenient for all of the parties except the initial plaintiff.
If certification is denied on desirability of concentration grounds, this
should not preclude relitigation of the certification issue in another forum.
Likewise, the amount of litigation underway concerning the claim'
will change over time, as will the lessons learned from observing the course
of the litigation. If, for example, certification is denied because there are
ongoing suits elsewhere at the time of the initial plaintiff's attempt at
certification, it would be appropriate to reexamine the issue if the claims in
those suits were not economically viable and were dropped before coming
to a resolution. A denial of certification based on this consideration should
be available for re-examination on a case-by-case basis.
A denial based on the potential difficulties faced in managing a class
action 45 should similarly be open to reexamination for two reasons. First,

In thinking about the importance of the notice and opt-out provisions, it is
useful to imagine the difference between a typical injunctive class action, which
might involve, for example, prisoners in a specific prison filing a civil rights suit
or all of the female employees of a company filing a discrimination suit, and a Rule
23(b)(3) potential plaintiff class, which might involve the drivers of three million
cars, see, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763,
765 (7th Cir. 2003), who would have no way of knowing who else might be in the
class with them. In the former case, it is much more reasonable to assume that
potential claimants have ways of identifying one another and influencing the course
of the litigation, therefore these claimants are less in need of notice or the
opportunity to opt out.
141 Id. at 769.
'..

43FED.

R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3)(C).

'44Id. R. 23(b)(3)(B).

,41 Id. R. 23(b)(3)(D).
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the decision of whether or not to certify a class is always discretionary,' 46
and this is an area in which the discretion should be broad. 4 7 Two different
judges may look at the same set of facts and have different perceptions of
manageability, or different skills and experiences-in management, which
makes the idea of a "proper" answer in this context unworkable. This fact,
which makes manageability subjective, eliminates or at least mitigates the
concern of the Bridgestone court that a "no preclusion" rule would lead to
mistakes. 48 Second, as litigation matures, the difficulties of class action
management may become less pronounced. For example, if all cases in a
particular controversy begin to settle for a predictable amount of money,
the difficulties of class management may disappear.
Assessing the interest of individuals in controlling their own
litigation 49 is more difficult, if not impossible, when assessing the
preclusive effect of denials of certification. It seems unnecessary to hold up
individual interests in preventing subsequent claimants from pursuing their
claims as a class if the subsequent certification of the class would not affect
the original plaintiff's chances of obtaining relief.
Therefore, under any of the criteria of Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class
actions, it is unnecessary and unfair to adopt a blanket rule preventing
subsequent attempts at certification. Courts should be responsive to
changing factual circumstances that affect the valuation of the Rule's
criteria.
CONCLUSION

This Note has examined the arguments for and against precluding
subsequent claimants from re-arguing class certification after a denial of
class certification in a prior litigation. There are strong pragmatic arguments arising from concerns of efficiency, accuracy, and symmetry that
may support adopting a broad preclusive policy. The difficulties inherent
in binding subsequent claimants that lacked notice or opportunity to
'"See, e.g., Mace v. Van Ru. Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 340, 342 (7th Cir.,
Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
1997);
147 Hartman, 19 F.3d at 1471 (noting that trial courts are uniquely equipped to
make class certification decisions because they have the "primary responsibility of
ensuring the 'orderly management of litigation' which is the purpose of class
actions" (quoting McCarthy v. Kleindients, 741 F.2d 1406, 1410 (D.C. Cir.
1984))).
148 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Bridgestone analysis concerning mistakes.
149 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
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839

participate in the first action, however, must be factored into the decision
as well. In fashioning rules in this uncharted territory, courts must resist the
blanket approach of the Bridgestone court and examine the policies,
rationales, and circumstances of each type of class action individually in
order to reach a decision that is fair to subsequent claimants.

